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I. INTRODUCTION
In Cunningham v. California,1 the United States Supreme Court
voted 6-3 to invalidate California’s determinate sentencing law
(“DSL”) as violative of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.2 The
Court held that, notwithstanding the California Supreme Court’s
determination to the contrary,3 the DSL conflicted with prior
Supreme Court precedent “by placing sentence-elevating factfinding
within the judge’s province,” thereby “violat[ing] a defendant’s right
to trial by jury safeguarded by the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments.”4
II. BACKGROUND
Cunningham is the latest in a series of recent cases dealing with
the constitutional implications of determinate sentencing schemes.
The Court first squarely addressed the issue in Apprendi v. New
Jersey,5 decided in 2000. Apprendi dealt with a New Jersey hate crime
statute that permitted a judge to impose an additional ten to twenty
years of imprisonment “if [he] found, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that ‘[t]he defendant in committing the crime acted with a
purpose to intimidate an individual or group’” because of
membership in a protected class.6 The Court found the statute to be
contrary to the Sixth Amendment, holding that “[o]ther than a prior
conviction . . . any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond

* 2007 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law.
1. Cunningham v. California, 127 S. Ct. 856 (2007).
2. Id. at 860.
3. People v. Black, 113 P.3d 534 (Cal. 2005), abrogated by Cunningham v. California, 127
S. Ct. 856 (2007).
4. Cunningham, 127 S. Ct. at 860.
5. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
6. Cunningham, 127 S. Ct. at 864 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 468–69).
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the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and
7
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”
In the years since Apprendi, the Court has reaffirmed its holding
8
three times, most recently in Blakely v. Washington and United States
v. Booker.9 Blakely applied the holding of Apprendi to Washington’s
Sentencing Reform Act.10 Defendant Blakely was convicted of
second-degree kidnapping, a class B felony carrying a maximum
11
sentence of 10 years. The Reform Act provided:
If no facts beyond those reflected in the jury’s verdict were found
by the trial judge, a defendant could not receive a sentence above a
‘standard range’ of 49 to 53 months. The Reform Act permitted but
did not require a judge to exceed that standard range if she found
‘substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional
12
sentence.’

As an aid, the Reform Act contained a nonexclusive list of
aggravating factors that would justify augmenting the sentence.13
However, no factor that was used to “comput[e] the standard range
sentence for the offense” (such as the facts relied upon by the jury to
convict) could be used to increase the sentence.14
In Blakely’s case, the judge imposed an enhanced sentence of
ninety months after finding that his crime was perpetrated with
“deliberate cruelty,” one of the aggravating factors enumerated in the
Washington statute.15 The Supreme Court applied the Apprendi rule,
finding that Washington’s Sentencing Reform Act was
16
unconstitutional. In doing so, the Court rejected Washington’s
argument that the case differed from Apprendi because “‘[u]nder the
Washington guidelines, an exceptional sentence [was] within the
court’s discretion as a result of a guilty verdict.’”17 Writing for the

7. Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
8. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 304–05 (2004).
9. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 243–44 (2005).
10. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9.94A.010–9.94A.930 (2007).
11. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 299.
12. Cunningham, 127 S. Ct. at 864–65 (quoting Blakely, 542 U.S. at 299–300).
13. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 299.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 300.
16. Cunningham, 127 S. Ct. at 865.
17. Id. (quoting Brief for Respondent at 15, Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004)
(No. 02-1632).
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Court, Justice Scalia pointed out that under the Reform Act, Blakely’s
enhanced sentence would not have been possible had the judge not
found and articulated an aggravating factor to justify that
18
enhancement. The fact that Blakely’s sentence fell within the
statutorily-prescribed ten-year range was irrelevant: “[T]he ‘statutory
maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge
may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict
or admitted by the defendant.”19 Thus, the Reform Act fell afoul of the
Sixth Amendment’s jury-trial guarantee as articulated in Apprendi.20
In United States v. Booker, the Court applied the Apprendi rule to
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.21 Like Washington’s Reform Act,
the federal Guidelines imposed a base sentencing range, one that a
judge could not exceed without finding additional facts by a
preponderance of the evidence.22 The Court held that there was “‘no
distinction of constitutional significance between the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines and the Washington procedures at issue in
[Blakely].’ Both systems were ‘mandatory and impose[d] binding
requirements on all sentencing judges.’”23 Accordingly, the Court
24
found the Guidelines to be in violation of the Sixth Amendment.
Rather than invalidating the entire Sentencing Reform Act,25
however, the Court excised the portion of the Act making the
26
sentencing scheme mandatory. “So modified, the federal sentencing
statute ma[de] the Guidelines effectively advisory. It require[d] a
sentencing court to consider Guidelines ranges, but it permit[ed] the
court to tailor the sentence in light of other statutory concerns as
well.”27

18. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 304.
19. Id. at 303 (emphasis in original).
20. Cunningham, 127 S. Ct. at 865.
21. Booker, 543 U.S. at 226–27.
22. Id.
23. Cunningham, 127 S. Ct. at 866 (quoting Booker, 543 U.S. at 233) (internal citations
omitted).
24. Booker, 543 U.S. at 226–27.
25. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 is the law that “comprehensively delineat[es] the
federal sentencing system.” Cunningham, 127 S. Ct. at 866.
26. Booker, 543 U.S. at 245.
27. Id. at 245–46 (internal citations omitted).
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III. CUNNINGHAM V. CALIFORNIA
This, then, was the state of the law when Cunningham v. California
reached the Court. In 2003, Petitioner John Cunningham, a California
police officer, “was tried and convicted of continuous sexual abuse of
28
a child under the age of 14.” Under California’s DSL, sentences of
six, twelve, or sixteen years were the three possible ranges of
29
incarceration for such an offense. The middle term of twelve years
was presumptive: “[T]he DSL obliged the trial judge to sentence
Cunningham to the 12-year middle term unless the judge found one
or more additional facts” by a preponderance of the evidence.30 Facts
found in mitigation would authorize the judge to reduce the sentence
to six years; facts found in aggravation would permit him to raise the
sentence to sixteen.31 In Cunningham’s case, the trial judge found six
aggravating factors and one mitigating factor; because the aggravating
factors outweighed those in mitigation, the judge sentenced
Cunningham to sixteen years in prison.32
Cunningham’s conviction and sentence were upheld by the
33
California Court of Appeal. The court disallowed four of the
aggravating factors upon which the lower court had relied, but it
nonetheless upheld the sentence, stating that “the court properly
found two aggravating factors and exercised its discretion in

28. Cunningham, 127 S. Ct. at 860.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Cunningham v. California, No. 010396-0, 2005 WL 880983, at *7 (Cal. App. 2005)
[hereinafter Appellate Decision] (“At sentencing, the court acknowledged that it had considered
the probation report, psychological evaluations, sentencing memoranda, letters from the
community in mitigation and letters from Doe and his mother. After denying probation, it
found the sole mitigating factor was appellant’s lack of prior criminal conduct. The court found
the following aggravating factors: (1) The crime involved great violence and the threat of great
bodily harm disclosing a high degree of viciousness and callousness. (2) The victim was
particularly vulnerable due to his age and dependence on appellant as his father and primary
caretaker. (3) Appellant threatened to commit bodily injury upon the victim in an attempt to
coerce the victim to recant his statements about the crime. (4) Appellant took advantage of a
position of trust to commit the crime in that he is the victim's father and sole caregiver for a
substantial period of time. (5) Appellant engaged in violent conduct which indicates a serious
danger to the community. (6) Appellant was a peace officer at the time he committed the
criminal acts, violating his duty to serve the community of which the victim was a member. After
finding that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the sole mitigating factor, the court
imposed the upper 16-year term.”) (internal citations omitted).
33. Appellate Decision, supra note 32, at *1.
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34
balancing them against a single mitigating factor.” The court also
considered Cunningham’s argument that the DSL ran afoul of the
Supreme Court’s decision in Blakely v. Washington.35 In holding that it
did not, the court stated that the statutory maximum for Sixth
36
Amendment purposes was sixteen years; thus, electing a sixteen-year
sentence was a permissible exercise of judicial discretion.37 The court
also acknowledged the United States v. Booker decision, which was
decided after Cunningham’s case had already been submitted for
appeal; however, the court found that the DSL was permissive rather
38
than mandatory, and thus was consistent with the Booker opinion.
One judge dissented, arguing that the sentence violated the Sixth
Amendment, because “[u]nder California’s determinate sentencing
scheme, the maximum sentence a court [could] impose without
making additional factual findings [was] the middle term.”39
Following the Court of Appeal’s decision, Cunningham filed for
40
discretionary review with the California Supreme Court. While his
petition was pending, the California Supreme Court handed down its
decision in People v. Black,41 holding that the DSL was not affected by
the Supreme Court’s decisions in Blakely and Booker. The court’s
main argument was as follows:

[T]he availability of upper term sentences under the determinate
sentencing law [did] not represent a legislative effort to shift the
proof of particular facts from elements of a crime (to be proved to
a jury) to sentencing factors (to be decided by a judge). The
Legislature did not identify all of the particular facts that could

34. Id. at *9.
35. Id.
36. Id. (“Under the California sentencing scheme the lower, middle and upper terms
constitute a range of authorized punishments for a given crime; the exercise of judicial
discretion in selecting the upper term based on aggravating sentencing factors does not
implicate the right to a jury determination because the upper term is within the authorized
range of punishment.”).
37. Id.
38. Id. at *9 n.14 (“Booker, in our view, clarifies that Blakely’s Sixth Amendment concerns
are inapplicable to statutory provisions that merely permit, but do not compel, the imposition of
a particular sentence upon a particular finding of fact. In California, [the DSL] permits, but does
not compel, the imposition of an upper term upon the finding of one or more aggravating
factors.”) (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted).
39. Id. at *10.
40. Brief for Petitioner at 10, Cunningham v. California, 127 S. Ct. 856, (No. 05-6551)
[hereinafter Petitioner’s Brief].
41. People v. Black, 113 P.3d 534 (Cal. 2005), abrogated by Cunningham v. California, 127
S. Ct. 856 (2007).
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justify the upper term. Instead, it afforded the sentencing judge the
discretion to decide, with the guidance of rules and statutes,
whether the facts of the case and the history of the defendant
justify the higher sentence. Such a system does not diminish the
42
traditional power of the jury.

Additionally, the Black court decided that the DSL passed
constitutional muster because it was “comparable” to the advisory
federal system upheld in Booker.43
Shortly after its decision in Black, the California Supreme Court
denied Cunningham’s petition for review.44 After his motion for a
rehearing was denied by the California Court of Appeal, Cunningham
petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari, which was granted.
Justice Ginsburg delivered the Court’s opinion, writing for a majority
of six justices. Justice Kennedy wrote a dissenting opinion, which was
joined by Justice Breyer. Justice Alito also dissented, with Justices
Kennedy and Breyer joining in his opinion.
The Court began by stating that the DSL was unconstitutional,
because it “assign[ed] to the trial judge, not to the jury, authority to
find the facts that expose[d] a defendant to an elevated ‘upper term’
sentence.”45 The Court held that “by placing sentence-elevating
factfinding within the judge’s province, [the DSL] violate[d] a
defendant’s right to trial by jury safeguarded by the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments.”46 In so holding, the Court unambiguously
rejected the Black court’s determination that the DSL had survived
Blakely and Booker.
As laid out by the majority, the case appears a straightforward
one. The Court marched through the Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker
decisions, discussing in great detail the relevant facts and points of law
47
raised by each. The Court heavily emphasized the “statutory
maximum” language found in Blakely: “[T]he relevant ‘statutory
maximum,’ this Court has clarified, ‘is not the maximum sentence a

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 544.
Id. at 548.
Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 40, at 10.
Cunningham, 127 S. Ct. at 860.
Id.
Id. at 863–68.
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judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he
48
may impose without any additional findings.’”
After thoroughly reviewing its sentencing guidelines precedents,
the Court then applied those precedents to the DSL. The DSL
involved sentencing increases based on judicial factfinding under a
49
“preponderance of the evidence” standard. Thus, the Court held that
“the DSL violate[d] Apprendi’s bright-line rule: Except for a prior
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and
50
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”
The Court’s reasoning appears straightforward; thus, it was with a
palpable sense of annoyance that Justice Ginsburg turned to a
51
discussion of the California Supreme Court’s opinion in Black.
Despite the seemingly self-evident nature of the Court’s precedent in
this area, the Black court read it differently, concluding that because
the DSL simply authorized a judge to engage in factfinding of a
traditionally judicial nature, “‘the upper term [was] the “statutory
maximum” and a trial court’s imposition of an upper term sentence
[did] not violate a defendant’s right to a jury trial.’”52 In support of its
conclusion, the Black court argued that the broad discretion given to
judges in finding aggravating factors distinguished the DSL from the
Apprendi cases.53 Unconvinced, the Supreme Court reminded the
California jurists that as “[w]e cautioned in Blakely . . . broad
discretion to decide what facts may support an enhanced sentence . . .
does not shield a sentence from the force of our decisions.”54 “If the
jury’s verdict alone does not authorize the sentence,” the Court
declared, “the Sixth Amendment requirement is not satisfied.”55
Although the Black court enunciated several other rationales in
support of its conclusion,56 the Court did not deem it necessary to

48. Id. at 860 (quoting Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303–304 (emphasis in original) (internal
quotations omitted)). The majority opinion quotes this sentence twice. See also id. at 865.
49. Id. at 868.
50. Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
51. Id. (“While that should be the end of the matter, in People v. Black, the California
Supreme Court held otherwise.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
52. Id. at 868 (quoting Black, 113 P.3d at 543).
53. Id. at 868–69.
54. Id. at 869.
55. Id.
56. See id.
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address them. Instead, after listing the Black court’s additional
arguments, the Court stated:
The Black court’s examination of the DSL, in short, satisfied it that
California’s sentencing system does not implicate significantly the
concerns underlying the Sixth Amendment’s jury-trial guarantee.
Our decisions, however, leave no room for such an examination.
Asking whether a defendant’s basic jury-trial right is preserved,
though some facts essential to punishment are reserved for
determination by the judge, we have said, is the very inquiry
57
Apprendi’s “bright-line rule” was designed to exclude.

If sentence-augmenting factfinding was performed by a judge, the
Court asserted, it is irrelevant whether or not “Sixth Amendment
concerns” were implicated.
The major disagreement between the majority opinion and Justice
Alito’s dissent concerned whether California’s DSL resembled the
post-Booker federal system. The majority argued that it did not,
pointing out that unlike the advisory federal system, California judges
were not free to exercise discretion in choosing the sentence to
impose.58 In Cunningham’s case, for example, the judge’s obligation
was “to select 12 years, nothing less and nothing more, unless he found
59
facts allowing the imposition of a sentence of 6 or 16 years.” Because
the judge’s discretion was thus limited, the majority argued that the
DSL did not resemble the advisory federal system.
Justice Alito disagreed, however, stating that “[t]he California
sentencing law . . . is indistinguishable in any constitutionally
significant respect from the advisory Guidelines scheme that the
60
Court approved in United States v. Booker.” He argued that both
schemes “grant[ed] trial judges considerable discretion in sentencing;
both subject[ed] the exercise of that discretion to appellate review for
reasonableness; and both—the California law explicitly, and the
federal scheme implicitly—require[d] a sentencing judge to find some
factor to justify a sentence above the minimum that could be imposed
based solely on the jury’s verdict.”61

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. at 870.
Id.
Id. at 873 (Alito, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
Id.
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Alito argued that California judges had at least as much discretion
as federal judges because they “retain[ed] considerable discretion to
62
identify aggravating factors.” He also emphasized the judges’ ability
to “consider any ‘additional criteria reasonably related to the decision
63
being made.’” Furthermore, Alito pointed out that the federal system
and the DSL both contained appellate “reasonableness” reviews to
64
constrain unbridled judicial discretion. His argument for an implicit
federal “aggravating factor” requirement also stemmed from the
reasonableness review: while no review is explicitly mandated, Alito
argued that a sentence imposed without any rationale would be struck
down as presumptively unreasonable.65
Ultimately, however, Justice Alito’s argument is unpersuasive.
Although parallels between the two systems did exist, they were
neither as substantial nor as significant as he made them out to be.
Under the federal sentencing law, judges are required to take certain
factors into account when sentencing; however, the judge decides
what weight to assign to any given factor and what sentence (within
the overall statutory range) to impose as a result. Contrast that with
the California system, where the only discretion that judges enjoyed
was in finding mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Only three
permissible sentences existed, and judges were bound to the middle
one unless they made additional findings. Additionally, Alito’s
argument regarding the implicit “aggravating factor” requirement
seems weak. Even if extreme results would be struck down under the
federal scheme, it does not follow that a judge must always find some
factor to justify a sentence above the minimum. To use Justice Alito’s
example,66 in a mail fraud case with a minimum sentence of probation
62. Id. at 877 (internal quotations omitted).
63. Id. (quoting CAL. RULE OF COURT (Criminal Cases) 4.408(a) (West 2006)).
64. Id. at 878.
65. Id. at 875–76.
66. Justice Alito employed a hypothetical example to exemplify his concerns with the
sentencing guidelines:
A simple example illustrates this point. Suppose that a defendant is found guilty of
10 counts of mail fraud in that the defendant made 10 mailings in furtherance of a
scheme to defraud. Under the mail fraud statute, the district court would have
discretion to sentence the defendant to any sentence ranging from probation up to 50
years of imprisonment (5 years on each count). Suppose that the sentencing judge
imposes the maximum sentence allowed by statute—50 years of imprisonment—
without identifying a single fact about the offense or the offender as a justification for
this lengthy sentence. Surely that would be an unreasonable sentence that could not
be sustained on appeal.
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and a maximum sentence of fifty years, a sentence of five years would
be unlikely to be overturned as unreasonable, even if no factors
supporting it were provided by the judge.
All three dissenters joined in Justice Alito’s opinion. Additionally,
Justice Kennedy filed a separate dissent in which he was joined by
Justice Breyer. In contrast with Alito’s dissent, which focused on the
case at hand, Kennedy’s dissent was of broader scope. Rather than
arguing simply that California’s DSL should be upheld, Kennedy
stated that “[i]n [his] view the Apprendi line of cases remain[ed]
incorrect.”67 Instead of overturning them, however, he advocated an
adjustment that could serve to rationalize the rule “while reducing the
collateral, widespread harm to the criminal justice system and the
68
corrections process” that he believed the cases were causing.
Kennedy suggested distinguishing between “sentencing enhancements
based on the nature of the offense, where the Apprendi principle
would apply,” and those “based on the nature of the offender, where it
would not.”69 Thus, Sixth Amendment rights would be protected, but
judges would be permitted to make rational determinations necessary
to craft effective punishments.
Kennedy made a convincing point when he reminded the Court of
why the DSL was passed in the first place. Prior to the DSL,
California had an indeterminate sentencing scheme, where vast power
70
and discretion resided in the hands of trial judges. Such a system, he
stated, would have been untouched by the Apprendi line of cases.71 It
is ironic, then, that when the California legislature sought to make its
sentencing system more consistent, to hold its judiciary to an

Suppose, alternatively, that the sentencing court finds that the mail fraud scheme
caused a loss of $1 million and that the victims were elderly people of limited means,
and suppose that the court, based on these findings, imposes a sentence of 10 years of
imprisonment. If the defendant challenges the sentence on appeal on the ground that
these findings are erroneous, the question whether the defendant will be required to
serve 10 years or some lesser sentence may well depend on the validity of the district
court's findings of fact.
Id. at 876 (internal citations omitted).
67. Id. at 872 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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72
accountable standard, the Court struck down that system. Such a
result, Kennedy argued, seems counterproductive.
Justice Kennedy’s dissenting opinion is a powerful appeal for
reason in the Court’s Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. Given that
only one other justice joined Justice Kennedy’s dissent, however, it
would appear that his plea had little effect. Cunningham v. California
commanded a sizeable majority in favor of the Apprendi line of cases,
and thus they are unlikely to be overturned or even substantially
modified in the near future. For all practical purposes, Cunningham
sounded the death-knell for state determinate sentencing laws, at least
as they are currently written. Post-Blakely and Booker, a number of
states had already altered their sentencing laws; now, the remainder
will likely do so as well. One solution is to place all factfinding in the
hands of a jury, “either at trial or in a separate sentencing
proceeding,” in order “to find any fact necessary to the imposition of
73
an elevated sentence.” Another option is to mirror the federal
scheme, giving judges genuinely “broad discretion within a statutory
range.”74 Regardless of what course is taken, however, all states with
DSLs now have an even greater incentive to change them. In light of
Cunningham’s forcefully worded opinion, other states would do well
not to challenge the Apprendi line of cases.

72. Id.
73. Id. at 871.
74. Id.

